A Windows JScript loader masquerading as a “Phone Link” installer establishes persistence with Scheduled Tasks, retrieves a configuration file from GitHub raw, and downloads a second stage from http://<token>.org/in.mp3 saved as backup.bat. The campaign also triggers a beacon to breachsaver[.]com for installation tracking. The behavior provides reliable detection and eradication points across endpoint and network controls.
Analysis / Content (Markdown supported)
Threat overview
The sample (phonelink-windows-setup-app-24-6-32-EXE.js) is a WSH/JScript dropper that:
Creates batch scripts in
%LOCALAPPDATA%to (a) pull a config namedRfrom GitHub raw intofirewallcomponents, and (b) use theau=<token>value (defaultdll3) to buildhttp://<token>.org/in.mp3, saving it asbackup.bat. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]Registers twice‑daily Scheduled Tasks to run
firewall-update.bat,update.bat, andbackup.bat. Abuse of Task Scheduler for persistence is common and well documented. [forums.mal...ebytes.com], [reddit.com]Opens a minimized browser to
breachsaver[.]com/us.php?dl=phonelink&id=<COMPUTER>_<USER>, which is flagged as malicious infrastructure in urlquery (DNS4EU). [name.com]
Attackers regularly abuse GitHub raw to deliver configs/payloads due to trust and availability; this has been observed across malware and ransomware chains. Masquerading payloads with media extensions (e.g., .mp3) is a known evasion tactic. [atkore.com], [hackcheck.io], [thehackernews.com]
Attack chain / kill chain
User execution: Victim runs JScript “installer” (WSH).
Dropper actions: Creates
firewall-update.bat,update.bat; sets Scheduled Tasks (11:04–11:06 & 19:04–19:06). [blog.hunte...rategy.net]Config staging:
firewall-update.batpullsRfrom GitHub raw into%LOCALAPPDATA%\firewallcomponents. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]Second stage retrieval:
update.batresolves<token>(defaultdll3) and downloadshttp://<token>.org/in.mp3→%LOCALAPPDATA%\backup.bat. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]Beaconing: Browser to
breachsaver[.]com/us.php?...for tracking. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]
Note: A phonelink‑named batch with similar schtasks/PowerShell activity has been seen in public sandboxing, indicating broader lure reuse. [winhelponline.com]
Impact assessment
Persistence & recurring execution via Task Scheduler enables reliable second‑stage delivery. [forums.mal...ebytes.com]
Config‑driven domain token (from GitHub raw) allows agile infra rotation and complicates static blocking. [atkore.com]
Potential post‑exploitation depends on the downloaded
backup.bat; absent retrieval, treat as a generic loader with the ability to fetch arbitrary payloads.
Detection guidance
Endpoint indicators
Creation/execution of the following in user profile:
%LOCALAPPDATA%\firewall-update.bat,%LOCALAPPDATA%\update.bat,%LOCALAPPDATA%\backup.bat,%LOCALAPPDATA%\firewallcomponents. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]
Process ancestry:
wscript.exe/cscript.exespawningcmd.exe/powershell.exe;schtasks.exeinvoked by JScript.KQL (MDE – process events):
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(21d) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe","schtasks.exe") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Invoke-WebRequest","firewallcomponents","in.mp3","breachsaver.com","SCHTASKS /Create")
Browser or application behavior
Silent/minimized browser launches to
breachsaver[.]com/us.php?....PowerShell with
-WindowStyle HiddenperformingInvoke-WebRequestto GitHub raw and*.org/in.mp3. [atkore.com]
Network activity
raw.githubusercontent[.]com/p-d4/s/refs/heads/main/R(HTTPS) – config pull. [blog.hunte...rategy.net]http://<token>.org/in.mp3(HTTP) – second stage.http://www.breachsaver[.]com/us.php?dl=phonelink&id=...– beacon. urlquery indicates malicious verdict.KQL (MDE – network):
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(21d) | where RemoteUrl has_any ("breachsaver.com","raw.githubusercontent.com","in.mp3") or RemoteUrl matches regex @"^([a-z0-9-]+)\.org$"
High-level mitigation overview
Contain by blocking
breachsaver[.]com, derived<token>.orgdomains (starting withdll3[.]org), and path‑scopedraw.githubusercontent[.]comwhere feasible.Evict by removing the six Scheduled Tasks and four dropped files (see Remediation Steps).
Harden by restricting PowerShell and WSH execution policies, and by monitoring
schtasksusage per CISA guidance. [forums.mal...ebytes.com]Sign up FREE for my web app: https://cyberhawk.base44.app
X (Twitter): https://twitter.com/cyberhawkintel
Telegram: https://t.me/cyberhawkthreatintel